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HUNGARY'S EMERGING SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990S

BY

COLONEL FERENC VEGH
Hungarian Army

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HUNGARY'S EMERGING SECURITY POLICY IN THE 1990S

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Ferenc Vegh
Hungarian Army

Dr. Michael G. Roskin
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5050

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ABSTRACT

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Hungary is situated in a region where national animosities, deep-frozen under socialism, are still running high, and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities has not yet become the rule. The changed international environment requires a new security policy. In the history of the countries of Eastern Europe a new chapter was opened with the political and economic changes of the past four years. The security system built up and accepted by the two military alliances--NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization--and based on military force, has broken down, and the ideological struggle--based on the division of Europe--practically ceased. The Cold War era, which followed World War II and lasted for 40 years, is over. Political events in Hungary have speeded up. Hungary has made a gradual, peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy, but the economic miracle, the transformation of a rigid, planned economy into a prosperous one, is still far from accomplished. This study will examine the developing concept of Hungarian security policy.

INTRODUCTION

Almost every European crisis in this century has begun in Eastern Europe. Often they have led to war or to the brink of war. The Hungarian people inhabited their present homeland for the past 1100 years. Hungary is situated at an important crossroads of the "highways of the peoples" and often became the battlefield for conflicting faiths and ideologies.

The changes that took place in Europe in 1989-1990, including the shifts in regimes that came about after a quiet revolution, provide an unprecedented historical chance for Hungary. She has found herself in a situation where she does not belong to any military alliance, although interests orient the country toward the West. Working out a new security policy is an exceptionally important area of the country's renewal.

What can be done in the current European processes constitutes an enormous task. A new Hungarian security policy adjusted to the changed situation as well as to the principles and requirements of the defense of the country can be outlined as follows:

The maintenance of peace is the center of the Hungarian security concept. The maintenance of peace in this context does not simply mean the avoidance of war. Hungary considers the intention and will of countries to maintain peace a complex process which postulates the anticipation and reduction of conflicting interests by partnership, cooperation, and discussion.

A small country in both its economic and military potential, Hungary left to its own devices has never been and never will be able to guarantee its security by military means alone. In safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Hungarian Republic, Budapest does not consider any state an enemy until her own national interests are threatened. This does not mean that Hungary wishes to do away with its army. Hungary considers the

armed forces as the last means of defense of the country if threatened by armed aggression.

Hungarian thinking about security has always revolved around the premise that the security of each country is closely interrelated to the security of others, particularly of the neighboring states. No country is able to guarantee its own national security reliably if it tries to do so at the cost of the security of other countries.

Hungary sees her security and defense within the Helsinki-Vienna-Paris process and within the framework of the new European security system: That is, by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Despite the vulnerable and uncertain situation in the region at present (civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovak independence), Hungary is not now threatened by a direct danger of war. But there are clear sources of danger. Economic and political reconstruction within the context of democratic institutions is threatened by the inner political, economic, and social instability of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the ex-Soviet states together with unresolved ethnic and minority policies, and nationalism. Hungary is also threatened by the different forms of low intensity conflicts (international terrorism, armed ethnic or nationalist groups, increasing floods of refugees, environmental damages, and drug problems). These dangers represent a challenge for Hungary and the region which can be eliminated only by common efforts.

The aim of this paper is to examine the present situation, concepts, and elements of the national security policy of Hungary, and to analyze the problem of security based on the thought and procedures used at the U.S. Army War College. This study seeks the answers to and recommends the framework for security policy to achieve Hungary's security objectives in the 1990s. As

J. F. Kennedy said: "You military professionals . . . must be more than servants of national policy. You must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development of national policy."¹

INTRODUCTION TO HUNGARY, ITS VALUES AND INTERESTS

Geographical Environment:

Hungary lies in Eastern Europe in the Carpathian Basin formed by the Alps, the Carpathians, and the Dinaric Alps. The country covers 93,030 square km., about 1 percent of the European continent. Its population is 10,333,327 with a density of 112 per square km. The vast majority of the population speaks Hungarian, a Finno-Ugric language. According to the estimates made by minority associations, there are approximately 220,000 Germans, 110,000 Slovaks, 80,000 Croats, 25,000 Romanians, 5,000 Serbs, and 5,000 Slovenes living in Hungary. The Bulgarian minority numbers about 2,500, the Greek 6,000, the Armenian 3,000, and the Polish 15,000. The number of Gypsies ranges from 400,000 to 600,000. Administratively the country is divided into 19 counties and the capital, Budapest (population 2,018,035).

The population is 63 percent urban. The religious breakdown is 67 percent Roman Catholic, 33 percent Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, and other. Hungary extends only 268 km from north and south, and 528 km from east to west. She is a landlocked country and shares its 2,113 km border with Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. The country lies at the junction of three climatic zones, which gives it a variable climate. Hungary is a low-lying country, two-thirds of it being plain with an altitude of less than 200 meters above sea level. Hungary is poor in natural resources. Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 2,880bn forints (\$53,90bn) in 1991, and the defense budget was 59,60bn forints (\$1,6bn) in 1992.

Historical Background:

The Magyars wandered from the Asian plains arriving in their present homeland in the 9th century. Hungarians are a justifiably proud, nationalistic people, but Hungary is a place of historical storms with an unfortunate 1100-year-old history replete with many invasions by Tatars, Turks, Habsburgs, Russians, Romanians, Germans, and Soviets. Attempts to throw off their occupiers have been largely unsuccessful. The first king of Hungary, Saint Stephen, adopted Christianity and made a powerful constitutional kingdom of the old tribal state while opening the gates towards Europe. In the 13th century Hungary was invaded by Tatars. Hungary, the domain of King Matthias Corvinus, flourished during the Middle Ages, when at her borders a new dreadful conqueror appeared, the Turks. Although crushed by the Ottomans for one and a half centuries, the small nation maintained its nationhood and helped the Habsburgs protect Europe from the Ottoman Empire. With the Turks expelled in 1699, natural development of Hungary resumed in time for the flourishing of Baroque.

In the mid-19th century Hungary was dominated by Habsburgs. The great statesman Lajos Kossuth initiated the Revolution and Freedom Fight of 1848-1849 that was defeated with aid of the Russian Tsar. In the second half of the last century the Austro-Hungarian Empire leapt forward and participated in the development of Europe. Development was impeded by World War I. After World War I, the unfair 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its territory and one-third of its population, a very sensitive point in Hungarian history and policy. The minorities became factors intensifying antagonism between the nations. After the Trianon partition 2,500,000 Hungarians live in Romania. In Slovakia there are 700,000; in the former Yugoslavia, 500,000; in Subcarpathian Ukraine, 200,000; and in Austria,

70,000. Between 1938 and 1941, part of those lost territories were handed back to Hungary, but during World War II Hungary fell under German occupation.

In 1945 the 1920 borders were reaffirmed by the Allies, and Hungary, under Soviet occupation, started to build socialism and joined the COMECON and Warsaw Treaty Organization. Communism was unwelcome by the majority of the population, but with the Revolution of 1956 Hungary became a pioneer in the efforts to get rid of it. The brutal suppression of national independence and the ensuing Russian revenge intimidated most Hungarians. The cautious reforms introduced during the Kadar years made Hungary less an orthodox and rigid socialist country.

From 1988 political events in Hungary accelerated. On 23 October 1989, the Republic of Hungary was reproclaimed, and in 1990, the first free elections were held since 1945. The country restored a multi-party system, (6 parties are in the parliament), parliamentary democracy and the institution of president of the republic (who is the commander in chief of the armed forces), and established a Constitutional Court. In 1990 Hungary initiated the dissolution of the WTO and the last Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country.

Beyond domestic changes, the international environment changed drastically and improved steadily since 1989. In 1991 Hungary signed a protocol with the European Committee (EC) to become an associate member. The North Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC) is the institutional liaison between NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. Hungary is a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and participates in newly created regional forms of cooperation (e.g., Central European Initiative (CEI), the Visegrad Triangle, later Visegrad Group). Hungary has taken a large step to promote democracy and create a comprehensive security network, and has made

bilateral military agreements with numerous countries. Military reorganization has begun; a major task is to replace obsolete equipment with new technologically superior equipment. Completing this task will define new security policy and economic opportunities for the country.

National Values:

The term values refers to beliefs or desires that guide or motivate attitudes and actions. Values may concern the worth or importance of people, concepts, or things. Beliefs are the convictions commonly held by society. Security policy must be consistent with national will and values. Values give direction, meaning, and purpose to security policy. In a free society, security policy ultimately rests and is dependent on the values of a nation's people. Security policy is governed by national values and must be in harmony with them. National values are generally long-lasting, but have been known to evolve with the tides of economic, social, and political change.

What are the Hungarian national values?

- o freedom;
- o liberal, constitutional, multi-party democracy;
- o privatized, free market economy;
- o respect for minority rights; and
- o civilian control of the armed forces.

Hungary's political system has instituted these values, and they are those that should be followed in the formulation of security policy.

The following fundamental Hungarian values are particularly relevant and reflect U.S. national values:

- o Self-determination. Each nation has its own right to determine its own policy and to govern itself. Through free and fair elections, people have the right to determine how and by whom they will be ruled.

- o Rights of the individual. Every person is intrinsically a moral, legal, and political entity to which the system must respond.

- o Right of the people to change governors. "This is an absolute right and means that the people are the final authority regarding who should rule."²

- o The right to live in peace and independence within a sovereign state.

George Bush's words are also relevant to Hungarians: "We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish."³

National Interests:

National interests may be defined as follows: "The country's perceived needs and aspirations in relation to other sovereign states constituting its external environment."⁴ National interests are the product of a political process in which the country's elected national leadership arrives at decisions about specific external events that affect the nation's political and economic well-being and security requirements. National interests promote Hungarian values; to promote these values means to protect them by establishing and implementing effective national security policy. Interests are expressions of values.

Priorities among the interests can be listed as follows:

- o First order or survival interests: The very existence of the nation is in peril, such as protection of the homeland and issues directly affecting this. This may require total military mobilization and total national resource commitment. Survival national interest normally has two characteristics. First, it is so overwhelmingly important to the state that it is unwilling to compromise. Second, a nation-state normally will go to war over it.

o Second order or vital (critical) interests: Serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones, are not quickly taken by the government. These issues do not immediately affect Hungary's survival but have a high probability for becoming first-order interests.

o Third order or major (serious) interests: Serious harm could come to the nation if no action is taken.

Basic Hungarian interests are as follows:

Security Interests:

- o insuring the survival of Hungary as a free and independent nation, with its values intact and its institutions and people secure;
- o sustaining Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- o defending freedom, peace, and the democratic political system;
- o deterring any aggression that could threaten the security of Hungary;
- o restraining the proliferation of armaments while improving stability by equitable arms control;
- o contributing to collective security, including U.N. mechanisms;
- o providing security in a possible low-intensity conflict (within the country's borders); and
- o building up a new national military strategy and defense system.

Economic Interests:

- o sustaining an open, free-market economic system;
- o stabilizing the economy, fighting inflation, reducing foreign debt;
- o promoting a dynamic economy, while making a stable, convertible currency;
- o promoting economic expansion to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors;

- o keeping the deficit under control and in line with IMF guidelines;
- o continuing restructuring, reprivatization, and investment of capital;
- o ensuring access to mineral resources, energy, markets, and capital; and
- o fully integrating into the European and world economy.

Foreign Policy Interests:

- o protecting peace;
- o maintaining a stable and secure country and region, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish;
- o providing healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with neighbors and friendly nations;
- o representing the rights of ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, with active minority rights protection;
- o achieving full membership in European institutions that provide political, economic, and military security;
- o promoting subregional cooperation; and
- o supporting a stable and secure world order.

To promote these national interests Hungary needs political, economic, and social stability, and improved internal, foreign, and defense policies. As the great Hungarian military leader Miklos Zrinyi said: "Let's improve ourselves, reorganize our affairs . . . we are not inferior to any other nation."⁵

DEFINING SECURITY IN HUNGARY IN THE 1990S

Definition and New Meaning of Security:

One of the gravest consequences of the divisions of the Cold War in Europe was that natural economic and cultural ties that form an integral link between peoples were cut, and human relations stretching across the borders largely disintegrated. The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed the security

agenda in Hungary. In the Cold War years, threat perceptions on both sides were relatively clear. Today, in contrast, the potential security challenges are increasingly less straightforward. Indeed, it is perhaps better to talk of security risks and challenges rather than threats, because the latter implies a degree of directness and immediacy which no longer applies. Military responses to such security challenges--and to the political and social challenges linked to them--are not always appropriate.

The changing nature of the security agenda will undoubtedly necessitate a different system of security than that which has existed over the last decades. Peaceful and secure development must become a joint interest, and every country must identify with the need to prevent differences in views from spilling over into conflicts. Political, economic, cultural, and environmental cooperation is needed both on European and on regional levels.

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines security as

free from or not exposed to danger or harm; safe;. . .
something that secures or makes safe; protection; defense;
protections taken to guard against crime, attack,
sabotage, espionage, etc.

Policy is defined as: "A definite course of action adopted for the sake of expediency, facility, etc. A course of action adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, political party, etc."

National security policy: To secure a country's national interests, the national political leadership establishes policies to guide the formulation of a national strategy.

National policy: A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.

National security: A collective term encompassing both defense and foreign relations of a country. Generally considered, national security policy is comprised of five components:

- o foreign policy;
- o defense policy;
- o international economic policy;
- o intelligence policy; and
- o domestic policy.

National security now means more than military policy and strategy. The actions and goals of government and its strategy to achieve and ensure the psychological and physical demands of national security comprise national security policy. National security

signifies protection of the nation's people and territories against physical assault and, in the narrow sense, has come to be regarded as national defense. National security, however, has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm. National security also implies protection, through a variety of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state.⁶

In the field of international relations and strategic studies, there are a number of different definitions of, and methodological approaches towards, security, none of which is really able to capture the full richness of this elusive notion.

The question of military force remains at the heart of any strategic assessment of security relations. "In the modern world, security problems have become more and more complicated, as military threats to a state's political and territorial integrity have increasingly been accompanied by economic and social challenges to a society's viability."⁷ "At the same time, the relationship of military force to other forms of power has become

more complex than in earlier times, given the growing interdependence of the modern world."⁸ The military dimension of security, therefore, must be considered in the context of other important elements of security. These include political, economic, societal, and environmental factors. The political sphere plays a vital role because it mediates between the economic, social, cultural, and military factors in any human endeavor. The economic dimension is also crucial to security, because it determines access to resources, markets, and finances, and because it provides the decisive basis for political influence and military power.⁹

Societal factors are less tangible, but no less significant. They are important because they affect the stability and character of a state's political system; the military capability of the state; its economic performance and capacity to generate scientific and technological innovation; and the atmosphere in which the values which affect the behavior of states in the international system develop and mature.

Finally, there are environmental factors. In the past, they were not so important and politically controversial, but in the age of Chernobyl, acid rain, river pollution, deforestation, global warming, the greenhouse effect, and dangerous toxic emissions, they are becoming increasingly more significant.¹⁰ Indeed, environmental and ecological concerns are likely to become a major security issue by the early part of the 21st century (e.g., the complications concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Danube project).¹¹ These dimensions are all intimately connected, and constitute an intricate nexus of factors which affect the nature of security in the global system.¹²

Security is a relative, not absolute concept: "A state is neither simply secure or insecure."¹³ Indeed, the search for absolute security is ultimately self-defeating, in that the attempt by individual states or groups

of states to achieve more security for themselves tends automatically to feed the insecurities of others. "This, in turn, is likely to provoke counterbalancing actions, leading to a decrease in security for all. It is this which constitutes the security dilemma."¹⁴

Security is linked to power, and the nature of power: It is therefore a relational concept. "Power never exists in a vacuum, it only exists in a relationship between two or more subjects."¹⁵

Finally, the concept of security is linked to other values, concerns, and interests. "Enjoying security (however relative) means a society is free to pursue a chosen way of life, and to determine its own course of action free from internal or external threats--of whatever nature (economic, political, military, societal, or environmental)."¹⁶

Security acquires new external dimensions. The challenges are now less military and more political or economic. Hungary's security policy should reflect her reaction towards the changes that have taken place already and should include her perceptions about influencing changes in a progressive direction, using her restricted opportunities. Simultaneously with the changes on the international scene, Hungary's internal conditions have changed to shape a new mentality. The democratic changes that have taken place in Hungary have left her outside of any defense pact and necessitated drawing up a new independent security and defense plan.

Security policy is changing. In a congratulatory telegram to President Bill Clinton, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall said:

Let me assure you that Hungary will continue to take joint measures for the settlements of conflict and establishing world democracy. Hungary is especially interested in these developments since East-Central Europe, which offered optimistic perspectives after the political transition, presently is the scene of severe conflicts. A bloody civil war is raging on our southern borders and the general situation in our region is unstable. Hungary, a

small country that endeavors to create political and economic stability, is not in the position to overcome these difficulties by herself. Therefore, one of our most important goals is to join the Euro-Atlantic political, security, and economic integration in the near future.¹⁷

It is not easy to predict the future. Despite some dangers, Hungary's relations with neighboring countries are mostly properly arranged and promising. The basic question, however, is to what extent they will conform to the principles in the Declaration of Universal Human Rights concerning the large Hungarian minorities that live in these lands. Speaking about minorities, Antall said:

Hungary has abandoned any plans of forcibly changing the borders, but will always speak out for the rights of ethnic Hungarians. Peoples of the region, regardless of national origin or minority status, should feel at home in their own countries in full possession of their rights to preserve their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identity.¹⁸

The protection of minority rights and interests does not depend on altering the borders. Hungary has no territorial claims towards its neighbors. If there are problems with Hungarians living outside the country, the Hungarian government cannot solve them unilaterally.

Foreign policy plays an important role in Hungary's security policy, which endeavors to achieve a much stronger integration into European institutions. Defense policy is only one element of the security policy, together with components generated by economic instability, jeopardy to democracy, migration, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian or ecological problems.

Swiss or Austrian style neutrality is not in Hungary's best interest, and neither are solely regional security systems. Hungary should contribute to establishing a new European security system which should be based on effective, concerted, and complementary cooperation between the existing

European and trans-Atlantic institutions such as EC, NATO, WEU, CSCE, and the European Council.

The Cooperation of the Visegrad Triangle composed of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland has become a new framework for an Eastern European relationship based on these countries' mutual traditions and capabilities, on the results in construing democracy and market economies, and on the mutual intention of full scale participation in the European integration process. The Visegrad countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) have agreed to establish a political dialogue with the EC, and they are interested in cooperation of the future foreign and security policy of the European Union. This setup is not a military alliance, but it does perpetuate a feeling of security and stability in the region.

Hungary, as a state directly affected by the fighting in former Yugoslavia, made efforts for settling the crisis by political means, and it succeeded in keeping itself from the conflicts despite a series of provocations.

In Hungary's view, the CSCE plays a decisive role in creating a unified and free Europe. The CSCE is an excellent global, political, and legal framework for European security. It is also Hungary's belief that time is ripe for turning the CSCE into a peacekeeping organization. Hungary is also trying to raise relations with NATO to a qualitatively new level. Her longer aim is to reach full membership in NATO.

Factors Determining the Security of Hungary:

Hungary is situated in a region of Europe where social, national, and ethnic conflicts have come to the surface like an explosion after the collapse of communist regimes. In the present situation the security of the Hungarian Republic has two key questions. The process of her integration into the

European or Western European community, and the establishment and strengthening of settled relations with her immediate and more distant neighbors. The task of Hungarian security policy is to defend the internal stability of the country from the instability of its neighbors and from the unfavorable effects arising from conflicts in the region. Hungary's security policy should be based on realizing the difficulties of transition in her region. Hungary has to face the dangers posed when economic and social problems result in sharpening national/ethnic conflicts, especially when a significant number of Hungarians live in neighboring countries. Erno Raffay, former political state secretary at the Defense Ministry visited Romania and said:

. . . in Kolozsvar, however, Mayor Funar began his talk by saying that I committed a violation of the law. He said that I violated some regulation by committing the 'dreadful thing' of mentioning Cluj-Napoca by the name of Kolozsvar in my greeting address. . . . Therefore, Funar took me to task and told me that there was no such place in Romania called Kolozsvar.¹⁹

Hungary attaches great importance to the minority policy of her neighboring countries. Her demand is that Hungarians in these countries should be allowed to remain Hungarians.

There are many tasks for Hungary's new security policy. Hungary has to consolidate the results achieved by diplomatic means, stabilize her internal situation, and become a model for neighboring countries.

How could CSCE be modified? The CSCE is still only a grouping of 52 states in the process of giving itself proper function, structure, and coherence. With new democratic countries, CSCE has become a different organization. The CSCE lays down the principles of relations between states, creates the framework for preventing and resolving conflicts, encourages the reduction and control of armaments, and permits the formation of military peace missions.

The CSCE must define its responsibilities. The CSCE should establish itself as an institution for political cooperation and collective security and as a valuable part of the European peace, should increase its potential for moral pressure, and should deal with every question about security threatening Europe's peace. European security would be more secure under a strong CSCE. The CSCE should develop a mechanism proscribing the use of military forces, and have a panel of jurists, free from political influence, to protect human and minority rights. Hungary also needs to look for new partners utilizing an increased global foreign policy activity.

Threats to Hungary's Security:

The successful transition of post-socialist countries to democracy is in the best interest of all the world. Hungary shares a responsibility for ensuring peaceful change. The challenges and risks concerning the security of Hungary differ from that of the past.

The threat may not be as clear as it once was, but the world is still a dangerous and ambiguous place. Preparing strategic leaders for an uncertain future is what the War College is all about. Ambiguity, when viewed positively, is a thinking man's playground.²⁰

Hungary does not now face nor expect aggression directed toward her. The possible risks threatening security are of a different character and multidirectional. Among them there are the lack of stability, uncertainty, and ambiguity in the region which derives from the grave economic, social, and political difficulties of this region, together with ethnic-nationality rivalry, and territorial disputes.

Nevertheless, for the rest of this century, the chief direct threat to security and stability in Hungary is not likely to be planned aggression across national borders. Rather, it will emanate from ethnic and economic tensions within some neighboring states (especially with Serbia, Romania, and

Slovakia). The region is a complex mosaic of different national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious groupings. In Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia, incredible and slanderous statements are made regularly against Hungary. Vladimir Brankovic, the president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia agreed with the proposal of a member of Romanian Senate, that Little Entente should be renewed.²¹

An armed conflict in any neighboring country could spread into the Republic of Hungary. That such conflicts may directly impact the Hungarian minority can lead to a spread of fighting that might move toward her territory. The U.N. suggests ways to head off conflicts before they break out through "preventive diplomacy." Among these is establishing new "early warning systems" to spot crises in the making and deploy peacekeeping forces in threatened countries to deter aggression.

Though it is unlikely, Hungary cannot exclude the possibility that extremist forces could come to power which pursue an aggressive, nationalist policy against their minorities and their neighboring countries, and that they will resort to solving disputes by means of force and confrontation instead of cooperation. If this were to happen, Hungary must prepare to defend the sovereignty of the country.

Nationalism may be the chief reason for instability. Intolerant nationalism endangers stability. A European-led political method to control nationalism must be found. "However, if nationalism takes an extreme form, it must be handled as aggression."²²

Due to Hungary's geographical location, she has to take into consideration economic, ecological, and social dangers. The high dependence of the country on oil and electric imports poses a serious security risk. It is an

additional concern that the pipelines and electric lines run through the territories of war-torn Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine.

Environmental damage and related tension also pose a threat to security. Hungary's dispute with Slovakia concerns the Gabčíkovo-Bos project that diverts the Danube. With diversion of the river, Slovakia damages both the environment and bilateral relations. The "Bos issue" is now at the Hague-based International Court. Technological advances have also created environmental degradation (nuclear, biological, chemical, and industrial).

Hungary is further threatened by the constantly increasing flood of refugees and migrants from East-West or South-North directions. Hungary has long been a transit country, but she will never be able to absorb large number of refugees.

Hungary may be threatened by different categories of low-intensity conflicts (LIC)--lower order conflicts like international terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, international arms bazaars, communal violence, and religious fundamentalism. By LIC one understands various forms of unconventional conflict.

Conflicts within or outside Europe could be of indirect consequence, and thereby have a harmful political, economic, or social effect on the Hungarian Republic. Hungary has a responsibility under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter to put armed forces at international disposal for countering aggression.

Concepts and Elements of New Hungarian Security Policy:

Hungary considers a new definition of the basic concepts and elements of her future national security policy an important task. The new security policy must adjust to changed situations and realities, as well as changing principles and requirements concerning the defense of the country.

The Hungarian security policy concept is centered on preserving peace and, preventing war and armed conflicts. Her military doctrine has a mostly defensive character. Beyond safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Hungarian Republic, and accomplishing tasks requested by the U.N., it has no other objectives which need be attained by military force. Further, by engaging in defensive maneuvers her forces provide the Hungarian civil and military diplomatic body with enough time to take appropriate international action in protecting her interests.

In the framework of security policy the military element is placed behind joining a new European security system and establishing a security partnership with neighbors. The armed forces are considered as only the last means to defend the country. Hungarian security policy starts from the fact that the international situation has transformed: The strengthening of the Helsinki process and the realization of the provisions of the Paris Charter--on the whole, the new European view of security--mark the beginning of a new stage in handling military security. The security of the country can be achieved not by giving up the necessary defensive capability, but by strengthening bilateral relationships with the nations of the world, particularly the neighboring nations, by developing the national economy, by internal stability, and by confirming the social security of the nation.

The most important endeavor is to achieve integration in the new European security system, and in the fundamental European institutions (EC, WEU, CSCE, NACC), since the realistic security of a country of Hungary's size can be imagined only on this basis.

Membership in the EC for Hungary suggests permanent integration into developed Western market economies, and as a result, reaching economic security--the ultimate objective of the Hungarian security policy. The recent

associate member contract was an important milestone on the road towards gaining full status membership. Economic security can lead to other fields of security policy as well. The EC membership makes Hungary's membership status in the WEU possible, which could result in achieving further NATO security agreements.

Since Hungary's home defense principles are defensive in nature, she does not consider any other nation or country to be her enemy. Hungary does not have a preconceived enemy picture, and is against changing any borders by force. She is planning on solving any disputes with other countries in a peaceful way, by political means. She is trying to avoid any military involvement in conflicts of other nations. For this very reason, Hungarian foreign and security policy must work as much as possible toward improving relations with neighboring countries, removing the centers of tension through joint efforts, implementing confidence-building measures like "Open Skies" or "Open Barracks" and others. Hungary is trying to take into consideration her neighbors' rightful security interests. Hungary's integration into the West is possible only if she plays a stabilizing role in the region. Hungary does not own, nor does she store, weapons of mass destruction, and she does not permit transportation or storage of such through her land or airspace by another country.

In summary, as a result of the changing circumstances, Hungary's security now primarily serves her political, economic, and social stability. Current foreign and defense policies regarding traditional aspects of security unquestionably mean that a long-term solution will be brought about only by a comprehensive collective European security system. Unfortunately, a long time will have to pass until this is created.

WORKING FOR A STRATEGY TO MAKE HUNGARY SECURE

Short Strategic Appraisal of Region:

The modern meaning of security covers political and military issues, as well as economic, ecological, social, and ethnic aspects. In each of these categories, Hungarian security policy conforms to international law, especially the law of the U.N., the provisions and decisions of the CSCE, and bilateral and multilateral agreements to which Hungary is a party (more than 20).

Hungary respects the sovereignty of other states and dispenses with the threat or use of force in bilateral relations with other states. Hungary's security may have deteriorated with increasing instability in her neighborhood. New challenges have arisen which can be summarized as follows:

- o The number of Hungary's neighbors has increased from five to seven (Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia). With the exception of Austria these states can be characterized by varying degrees of instability in their internal situations and relations with their neighbors;
- o Today Budapest considers two neighboring countries, Ukraine and Romania, medium world powers;
- o Nationalist politicians in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia are trying to influence political mood by projecting an enemy image onto Hungary. The disintegration in Hungary's neighborhood is not compensated by transition aimed at democracy;
- o The CFE Treaty could lead to establishing a balance between the armed forces of Hungary and its neighbors. Unfortunately, civil war and growing nationalism threatens this balance, and political control over the armed forces is not assured in some of the neighboring states;

- o Large numbers of refugees from Romania and ex-Yugoslavia have pushed Hungary to the limits of its burden-bearing capabilities;
- o Instead of the former Visegrad Three there are now four states, which further complicates plans for cooperation; and
- o The existence of Hungarian minorities beyond its borders means Hungary can be blackmailed, possibly by Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania acting in concert.

The countries of the region are now free from the dominant influence of the former USSR, yet at the same time face sharp difficulties in internal transition.

Hungary is a good neighbor with Austria. The Republic of Austria was established in its present form in 1945. Allied occupation forces remained in Austria until 1955, when full sovereignty and independence were realized. Austria today is a federal parliamentary democracy with an official policy of neutrality. Austria is currently a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Negotiations are under way which Austria hopes will result in EC membership by 1995. Austria has a small (7,867,541) population and 83,850 square km territory. She maintains a significant amount of heavy and defense industry. The 1992 Austrian defense budget represented 19.86bn OS (\$1.70bn). Austria's armed forces include 52,000 active personnel, 200,000 ready (72 hours) reserves, and 960,000 with reserve training but no commitment. The Army has 38,000 troops, which are grouped into various Field Units plus a Standing Alert Force of about 15,000. Austria deploys one infantry battalion in Cyprus and another in Syria in conjunction with the U.N. The Air Force of 6,000 is actually considered part of the Army.

Hungary has no problem with Austria in jointly handling the fate of Hungarians living there. The two countries have a very prosperous relationship. There is no threat from Austria to Hungarian security.

Hungary's newest neighbor is the newly-declared Republic of Slovenia. The Slovenes, a Slavic people, migrated southwestward across present-day Romania in about the 6th century. Slovenia was the first Yugoslav republic to hold multiparty elections in early 1990. In 1991 Slovenia declared her total independence from Yugoslavia and won it with little bloodshed. Slovenia is a member of the CEI. She had been the most prosperous region of Yugoslavia. Slovenia is a very small country, with a territory of 20,296 square km and a population of 1,963,000. The 1992 Slovenian defense budget represented \$170 million. Slovenia's armed forces include 15,000 active personnel, 85,000 reserves, and 4,500 armed paramilitary forces. A territorial Defense Force has been organized. Hungary has excellent relations with Slovenia. The Hungarian government concluded a friendship and cooperation treaty with Slovenia.

Hungarian-Slovene minority protection agreement registers principles that are in complete accordance with the vanguard of European thought and general human rights. These principles accept the existence of an ethnic group and see the people belonging to a national minority as part of a community. These documents promise protection to the minorities against all such incitement as threatens the given ethnic group. This implies the rejection of impatience, hatred, anti-Semitism, and anti-Hungarianism. The fact that they lay down the right to be involved in public affairs in an organized way is a very important part of these documents. This confirms the right of the given national minority to maintain links with its mother nation. The above documents also prohibit the artificial and forceful changing of the ethnic structure of the population.²³

There is no danger to Hungary from Slovenia.

Croatia is both an old and new neighbor of Hungary. She emerged as an independent nation in 924. Croatia was under Hungarian control for centuries.

Like Slovenia, Croatia was a relatively wealthy northwestern republic with longstanding cultural ties to Western Europe and a tolerance for liberal political experimentation. Croatia followed Slovenia in establishing multiparty elections in 1990. Croatia and Slovenia agreed to coordinate defense and security policies, but this development continued with a civil war between Croats and its ethnic Serbian minority. In 1991 Croatia announced independence and after consolidation the new government put the republic into the stream of Eastern European transition. Croatia has a 56,538 square km territory and 4,784,000 population, some of it lost to breakaway Serbs. Her armed forces include 105,000 personnel, 100,000 reserves. There are U.N. units from 18 countries now in Croatia. With a new organization called the National Guard, Croatia can field a total of nine small infantry brigades with a total of approximately 25,000 personnel. In addition, a number of commando units exist, supplemented by militia units and volunteer self-defense forces. Hungary's relations are good with Croatia; they signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, and there is an agreement on the protection of minority rights. After the current crisis is over, Hungary perceives no threat from Croatia.

Hungary's third southern neighbor is still called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An historical earthquake is taking place here. In June 1991 the outbreak of war was viewed as a "Yugoslav affair." A year later it was clear that the crisis was already a European affair, with the threat of igniting a more general Balkan War. Four of the federation's six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) have declared their independence. Now the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is composed only of Serbia, Montenegro, and the formerly autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. There is no parliamentary democracy at all in Serbia. Its territory is

102,350 square km, population 10,642,000. A further 2,032,000 Serbs were living in the other Yugoslav Republics before the civil war began. The FRY's defense budget represented 245,00bn New Dinars (\$3.76bn). The total armed forces include 135,000 active and some 400,000 reserves. The Yugoslav Army in Serbia (army, air force, navy) is at a similar level of development as the Hungarian Army. The new FRY dominated by Serbia is a regional problem. The Vojvodina is simply a continuation of Hungary's Pannonian Basin and for centuries was Hungarian. If Serbs enlarge their ethnic cleansing there will be many more refugees. Hungary has assisted the refugees but is financially strapped.

How will Budapest react to the mistreatment of ethnic Hungarians on three sides? The possibility of a Balkan War engulfing every country from Slovakia south cannot be discounted. The trigger would likely be Serbian mistreatment of Hungarians in the Vojvodina. One way to dampen this prospect would be to deliver European and American political and military aid to Hungary. This would put pressure on Serbia's northern flank and remind Serbs that Hungary felt entitled to seize these areas in World War II. The point is not to support Hungarian irredentism but to get the Serbs attention and deliver the message: You are vulnerable. If you try ethnic cleansing here, you will pay for it.²⁴

Hungarians in Vojvodina are living under tremendous psychological pressure; Hungarians have been expelled from their homes to make way for Serbian refugees. A lack of confidence has emerged toward FRY in Hungary. Serbia conducts a Serbianization campaign against Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Serbian forces may further expand the war, and possibly drawing Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey into the conflict. Pressures for international military intervention against Serbia have been growing. The U.N. had made steps, but Hungary proposes that the U.N. consider further actions. While it seems impossible to negotiate with the current Serbian politicians, some kind of compromise might be forged. In this crisis,

Hungary's fundamental security political interest should show maximum toleration, refrain from participation in any military intervention but firmly protect her border.

Romania is Hungary's eastern neighbor and has a common borderline of 443 km with Hungary. After the somewhat contrived "revolution" turning over the obnoxious Ceausescu dictatorship, Romania has not yet created a really free and democratic society nor increased the standard of living. Romania is struggling with economic and political problems, the difficulties of changing the regime, and minority problems. It has unresolved claims to Bukovina and Bessarabia/Moldova. Its territory is 237,500 square km, population 23,169,914. Romania's defense budget was 173.7bn lei (\$0.96bn). Last year the Romanian Army numbered 200,000 active and 593,000 reserves. It was deployed in four districts and made up of four all-weapon armies. Romania built up a concentric defense, but its strongest army, the 4th Army, is deployed in Transylvania out of a mistaken fear that Hungary has revisionist plans. It seems that the Romanians have not yet begun the implementation of the Paris Agreement on the reduction of conventional weapons. At the same time, they do not have money for modernization, and they find it difficult to maintain the army's current size. Romania's military doctrine accepted by the States to organize and prepare for deployment of the armed forces in concert with the national interests. Romania's President Ion Iliescu said:

National security consists of two elements: internal and external factors . . . the internal factor means internal stability on the political, economic, and social planes, with primary responsibility for that devolving on the internal political forces. The second factor is the international situation. In this respect, our foreign policy of opening and the improvement of ties with neighboring countries, the European countries, and the great countries of the world, on one hand, and our relations with international bodies, including NATO, the Council of Europe, and so forth, on the other, will secure a new foreign framework for national security.²⁵

A short time later the Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu said:

The great danger posed, in our opinion, by the rebirth of nationalism in several East European countries, and the use of minorities in creating tension, promoting the idea according to which the armed forces of a country would have to protect the minorities in other countries.²⁶

Fear has emerged toward Hungary in Romania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia because these countries think that Hungary wants a revision of borders, and they use this claim for domestic propaganda. Hungary says that she has never considered making a military threat to neighboring countries. The situation of the Hungarian minority is a painful point in Hungarian-Romanian relations and a permanent source of tension. From time to time--mostly due to the actions of extreme Romanian nationalists--it is suddenly amplified, further clouding relations between the two countries and impacting on Hungary's security policy as a significant risk factor. Hungary has agreements on the protection of national minorities with several countries, and they have attracted considerable international attention. Unfortunately Romania is an exception to this. The main reason for this may be the fact that such agreements include autonomy on a regional basis and self-administration by national minorities. These principles already formally existed in Romania before the Romanian national assembly's declaration in Gyulafehervar 1918 promised self-government and self-administration to the Hungarians. There is no bilateral state agreement between the Hungarian and Romanian Republics; however, there exists a valid agreement between the Ministries of Defense and the General Staffs, which offers certain mutual guaranties. The relationship between the Hungarian and Romanian military leadership is considerably better than the relations between political leaders. In the Hungarian-Romanian relationship, cooperation in the fields of Open Skies and open military

barracks can be regarded as successful. But there remains security risks from Romania because of the unresolved minority problem.

From among the successor states of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine is an important East European power for Hungary, being her eastern neighbor. The referendum on 1 December 1991 confirmed the independence of Ukraine by a convincing majority. The independent republic, with a population of 51,940,426 million people living on 603,700 square km, is a significant political and military force in this region. Ukraine was called the food store of the former Soviet Union, though it also has important industries and rich natural resources. There are still sharp debates between the Russian and Ukrainian leadership on the division of military forces and equipment. The 1992's defensive budget of Ukraine was 116bn tubel. Its armed forces total 230,000 active (excluding the Strategic Nuclear Forces and Black Sea Fleet). Reserves are some one million with military service within the past five years. The strategic missile units have some 176 ICBMs including SS-19s and SS-24s. The strategic strike air force has some 41 long-range strategic bombers. The Ukrainian ground forces consist of 150,000 members (6 Army HQ, 1 Corps HQ, 1 Arty Corps HQ). The Air Force consists of 50,000 members (3 air army, some 1,100 aircraft). Air defense consists of about 30,000. The navy's Black Sea Fleet is to be divided between Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.

The objective of the emerging Ukrainian security policy is to preserve its sovereignty, support the territorial integrity of the country, and retain a democratic state order. The guiding principles of Ukrainian security policy are as follows:

- o rejection of war as a means of policy;
- o rejection of any state as her enemy;
- o rejection of territorial claims against its neighbors;

- o rejection of military actions against its neighbors if it is not attacked by them;

- o observation of the agreements on nuclear and conventional arms reductions; and

- o prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

In military defense Ukraine wishes to follow the principles of self-reliance and of refusing every military alliance because, in their opinion, it would restrict the sovereignty they have just achieved. Hungary has no problems with Ukraine. Today Ukraine is primarily concerned with Russia, and they are trying to slip away from the tight grasp that Moscow had until recently. The excellent Hungarian-Ukrainian relations were helped by the fact that Hungary did much for the independence of Ukraine, and it was among the first to recognize the new state. The only potential trouble can arise if a Ukrainian leadership would launch an intolerant policy against the Hungarian minority in Subcarpathia whose rights are now guaranteed. Presumably, Ukraine in the long-run--as a nuclear power or not--will take on a serious regional role in the East European region.

Hungary's new northern neighbor is Slovakia, with nearly 700 km of common border. The division of the CSFR on 1 January 1993 created a new state, the Slovak Republic, in the Carpathian Basin. For centuries Slovakia was ruled by Hungary. The territory of Slovakia is 49,009 square km with a population of 5,300,000, of whom 10 percent are ethnic Magyars, mostly living in southern Slovakia.

Slovakia will have to struggle with all the problems inherent in its new independence. In order to cover up problems, the nationalistic new regime may be tempted to try to direct the population's attention to foreign threats. A nationalistic Slovakia could destabilize Eastern Europe. At this moment,

Slovakia does not have an accepted military doctrine or defense concept, but it is certain that they will borrow some elements from old Czechoslovak federal military doctrine. This is probable also because of the security policy atmosphere in Europe and the fact that others in this region have also formulated very similar ideas. A Slovak Army is currently being formed, and it is expected to have 49,464 troops. The division of the Czechoslovak Army left Slovakia with the smaller portion but the bigger security problem. Redeployment of units into Slovakia is underway. According to the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the strength of the Army of the Slovak Republic is to be reduced to 46,667 men, 478 tanks, 683 armored carriers, 383 artillery pieces, 115 fighter jets, and 25 combat helicopters. The Slovak government will have to advance in a rational direction on security policy matters, a direction beyond nationalism; otherwise, it will risk its place in regional cooperation and European integration.

The new state's national minority policy, foreign policy, relations with its neighboring countries, its orientation, and its security and defense policy are not immaterial factors for the Hungarian Republic. There are two serious bones of contention between Slovakia and Hungary: Ethnic Magyars and the Danube Dam project. The emergence of Bratislava, already embroiled in minority problems with Budapest, will increase tensions in an already tense region. With the rise of Slovak nationalism, Magyar language rights came under attack, diminishing the use of Hungarian in schools and community life. The Hungarians of Slovakia react defensively.

Making matters much worse is the huge Gabčicovo-Nagymaros water power plant. It was devised by both Hungary and Czechoslovakia without public scrutiny in 1977. A Hungarian ecological movement made a major issue out of the dam (because of environmental erosion), and persuaded the government to

cease work on it in 1989. Later Hungary cancelled the treaty on Danube Dam construction, but the Slovaks pushed ahead with construction on their side. Despite protest, Slovakia diverted the Danube and began generating electricity in late October 1992. The Gabčíkovo Danube power plant has led to a serious crisis in relations between Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary asked the International Court of Justice to decide whether the diversion of the river is a violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty which defined the border as the middle of the main river. Hungary considers the issue a problem for all Europe, since the Danube is a European river.

There is some suggestion that if Slovakia found itself outside regional and continental integration, she would be forced to turn to old allies.

Slovakia, as mentioned, will have few friends but not zero friends. Precisely the other countries with Magyar minorities--Romania and Serbia--will find it expedient to support Slovakia in any tussle over minority rights. After all, they might be next to face Budapest's anger. Romania or Serbia could do little to come to the immediate aid of Slovakia--they do not border Slovakia and, both of them being in the international doghouse, are unlikely to get transit rights--but merely by arming and repositioning forces on their Hungarian borders, Romania and Serbia could signal a pro-Slovak position. We are reminded here of the Little Entente that France constructed in 1920-1921, consisting of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.²⁷

There is only one possible way for the Slovakian political leaders to guarantee their real security, and this can only be achieved by integration with neighboring countries and economic growth within their own country.

In sum, this region can be considered an important part of European security, an unstable region from the point of view of security policy. The above-mentioned East European countries (except Austria) struggle with similar problems in their economies and societies. Instability in Eastern Europe could last for some time. This region is unable to overcome this complex crisis by itself; it needs outside help.

The biggest step forward would be to integrate the countries of this region into a comprehensive European system initiated in Western Europe, into the planning and implementation of solutions leading to a unified and free Europe. Some countries must solve their nationality and minority conflicts as one of the important conditions for entering into the European community of nations.

Hungary's Security Strategy:

In a free society, strategy ultimately rests on the values of the people of the nation concerned. If these values are confused or superficial, the strategy adopted will have similar characteristics.

What is national strategy? It is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to further national interests, priorities, and policies. The elements of national power to assess the ability of nation-states to protect national interest are political, economic, and military. These elements are interrelated and interdependent and can only be artificially separated.

Political Strategy

National strategy must effectively integrate strategies for all elements of power, and all complete strategies employ the same thought processes and contain the same elements: Ends, ways, and means. Political strategy is meaningful only in the political context outlined below:

Generic	Military	Answers
Ends	Objectives	What?
Ways	Concepts	How, Where, When?
Means	Resources	With What?

Political elements of power are:

- o moral and political;
- o alliance;

- o developmental assistance;
- o international organizations; and
- o diplomatic mediation.

Some elements of political strategy have been addressed in this paper.

In summary, Hungary should continue the democratic transition in a steady atmosphere. This behavior should be a stabilizing force in the region. The democratization process and introduction of a market economy create conditions for the European integration and trans-Atlantic cooperation in the next few years. Hungary stands at a crucial point: Will she be able to speed up the transformation and become part of developed Europe or miss this opportunity and stay backward? The political and social situation will determine the time of joining the European organizations. Hungarian security interest presents a good, balanced cooperation with these organizations.

A very important part of political strategy is a stable relation with neighboring countries, and Hungary should avoid conflicts. In spite of the declared new values in the region (democracy, market economy), political differences may be small, but won't disappear. The Hungarian political strategy should avoid raising questions about borders. If, however, the Hungarian minority in a neighboring country suffers continuous decline in economic-social conditions or ethnic tension and nationalism turns into official policy, this minority should be able to request the right of self-determination. In Subcarpathia, Vojvodina, and Slovakia the result could be autonomy, but in Romania more than 40 years of ethnic cleansing makes that impossible, except for Szekelyfold. Hungary should issue no ultimata but could encourage a referendum about a border or negotiate in existing international organizations. They should be able to establish effective norms

for dealing peacefully with minorities. In the absence of this, all hopes for a new European architecture will be in vain.

Economic Strategy

The keystone of Hungarian economic strategy is to continue the transition toward a free-market economy. Basic goals remain unchanged: To create social-market economy, ensure economic stabilization, and attain healthy growth. Emphasis in future years will be placed on speeding up privatization, developing financial and capital markets, and further international integration of the country. Economic elements of power are:

- o economic vitality;
- o science and technology;
- o national assistance;
- o trade policies; and
- o embargoes.

Economic transition has four phases:

- o macroeconomic stabilization, in which Hungary should continue to implement the stabilization plan with tight fiscal and monetary policy;

- o redefine the role of the state, Western laws and market-oriented organizations, accounting and banking rules, tax codes, pension and unemployment system, labor laws, property and contract law, courts to enforce laws;

- o liberalize economy, keep free domestic prices, open international trade, accomplish currency convertibility, encourage import of foreign capital and management skills, eliminate controls on capital and free the flow of capital; and

- o continue gradual privatization.

In the second half of the 1990s, Hungary could become the regional economic and banking center, an economic bridge between West and East. If Hungary has a stable political landscape and economic strategy, she may be a center of investment for this region. At present, foreign capital is merely 8 percent of the Hungarian economy, and the country lacks sufficient resources. However, in the course of privatization the proportion of foreign property should not exceed 35-40 percent. It is a hope that Hungary will be a full member of the EC by the year 2000. Budapest should work for a "more than one foot standing" economic strategy.

Military Strategy

What is military strategy? In ancient Greece, it was the "art of the general." In its Glossary of Military Terms, the U.S. Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. The definition approved by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff states that military strategy is: "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force."²⁸ Military strategy consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements is incompatible with the others, the national security may be in danger.

In the security policy of Hungary, the military element is placed behind joining the new European security system and establishing a security partnership with the neighbors. Accordingly, the armed forces are considered as only the last means to defend the country. The defense capability of the Hungarian Republic is guided exclusively by the principle of restraint and defense. The military objective of Hungary is to offer armed resistance as

long as possible in order to prevent an invasion. In case of armed attack against the country, military force is used to stop the aggressor, to detain it in fulfilling its aim by causing the aggressor heavy losses, to restore territorial integrity, and to secure conditions for the diplomatic settlement of the conflict. It also serves to gain time to enable other countries and international institutions to react and restore the independence and sovereignty of the country. Hungarian armed forces have a defensive character. Its main aim is to avoid war and armed conflicts, to provide the armed defense of the country. Armed forces are deployed all over the country in order to offset an attack from any direction. Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, commander in chief of the army said: "A soldier who defends his homeland is worth more than the one who feels to be used as gun-meat in an offensive war, or who acts as an occupier, away from his country."²⁹

Establishment of a new Hungarian Army has already begun. The first goal is to change from mandatory drafting to a greater ratio of professional and enlisted soldiers, and at the same time modernize its organization. Alongside the maintenance of the fighting capability of the armed forces, Hungary has to strengthen the professional character of the military, which is dependent on the financial capabilities and the expected technical modernization in the second half of this decade along with a continuous increase in the ratio of professional members. The size of the army and its basic weapons is in keeping with the international commitments Hungary has accepted. The peacetime strength of the Home Defense Forces is about 100,000, which is in accordance with the CFE. The needed war strength with reservists is approximately 300,000. Hungary has to build up her armed forces to achieve this flexibility. The armed forces are made up of land forces (regular, territorial) and air defense forces.

Right next to Hungary's southern border, a killing war is endangering the security of the country. For this reason Hungary has to raise the standard of her military's reaction capabilities in the interest of managing possible conflicts along that border and to counter other crisis situations. The Hungarian Army has to be prepared to prevent crises and conflicts while preparing for military activity. Armed forces must have the ability to act in accordance with the level of the potential conflicts. The creation of air-mobile troops has also begun, and the long-term military-technology development concept (running until 2010) has also been prepared. However, this can only be realized with economic development. Military strategy can change rapidly and frequently, since objectives can change. By the turn of the century the Hungarian Army should become small-sized, have modern leadership, and in peace time a mainly professional army, while in war time it should be based on complementing this professional force with recruits of all persons eligible for military service, an army which can react speedily, which is capable of maneuvering, be mobile and a modern armed force, and that the militia-type territorial defense units should be an organic part of this force. However, it takes much longer to alter military forces so that they may be responsive to new objectives and concepts.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY POLICY

Hungary has taken several steps toward building a new security policy, but further efforts are needed to accomplish this task. Hungary places her military security behind the political one. Conflicts can be expected, but Budapest should keep away from the growing nationalism in the region. Hungary should avoid implying that outbursts against Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries might be solved with military involvement.

Hungary should consider the possibilities of bilateral treaties and joint coalitions which would increase her security. Budapest believes in the importance of the European security and cooperation process. The main goal should remain to achieve full membership in European organizations by the year 2000. Thus, any aggressor wouldn't face just one country but a whole coalition. The security of Hungary is not indifferent for the West; however, at the present time, NATO has expressed no interest in enlarging itself.

More attention should be paid to the role of the military in democratic society; that is, to strengthen civilian leadership and improve conditions in the armed forces. A new approach is needed to security problems. "Security must be seen in a broad perspective, not only in terms of the military or the defense (of one country) . . . ; Europe as a whole should be regarded as a uniform security area."³⁰ Future needs demand the transformation of military defense systems to fit all European (NATO) defense systems, including unified strategy, leadership, training, weapon systems, etc., in accordance with the new European security situation.

More attention should be paid to the management of the more probable lower intensity military conflict (military operations short of war), or in connection to other problems with military aspects such as border-air space violations, migration, natural disasters, participation in international conflict settlement, terrorist activity, and drug problems. Special military forces should be created that would train together and be prepared to act as a peacekeeping force.

Hungary, an ethnically homogenous country, can avoid the tragedy of disintegration, civil war, and local conflicts that has become characteristic of the area by using the diplomatic means to press for the early preparation and adoption of international guarantees for minority protection on regional

and global scales. Hungary must continue to pursue an active foreign policy aimed at promoting regional stability.

Because ensuring the homeland's security represents a national task, it must be based on the consensus of the entire society before and after the 1994 elections. Essential tasks are to continue a balanced interior policy, to safeguard democracy, to strengthen the democratic system, establish a free market economy, and handle increasing unemployment and poverty. In the volatile, transitional state of Eastern Europe the problems of the region can only be handled by cooperation between all states concerned.

CONCLUSIONS

A fundamental change in historic development has occurred in Hungary and in Eastern Europe in the past few years.

In the former era, disagreements and conflicts were suppressed violently, especially ethnic/national problems, which are now coming to the surface with unexpected vigor causing destabilization in the region. The overall political, economic, and moral crises, the difficulties of transition, and emerging tendencies towards intolerance and extremism further complicate these problems and throw more difficulties in the path.

Hungary can be considered part of an unstable region from the point of view of security policy due to the well known historical events. It has to face both old and new challenges. The radical political and social changes that have taken place in Hungary have had a major impact on its security policy.

The main national interests are to maintain Hungary's domestic political and economic stability and to continue to advance down the road to European integration. The loss of vital economic and political interests could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state.


Hungary's security policy should reflect her reaction towards the changes that have taken place already and should include her concepts about how to influence changes in a progressive direction. At the same time, Hungary would like to be flexible so that she can react to further changes.

Hungarian foreign policy must always consider that there are 15 million Hungarians--5 million outside of Hungary--and it must do this until she becomes part of a Europe in which borders have only a symbolic importance. It is the reality of these times that security must be viewed in political, military, and economic terms--a multidimensional concept. Hungary should adopt today's risks, reality, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The new, cooperative approach to security will undoubtedly gain importance.

Budapest's objective in the 1990s is membership in European organizations. The CSCE could be the political, diplomatic, and institutional framework for a new Europe, while NATO (after reform) remains the basic factor of political-military stability and peace in Europe. But a successful transition and Hungary's engagement with Europe is dependent on international assistance and acceptance.


The world is changing faster than we realize and we had better be thinking and talking about how to respond to those changes. If you are not current, you are history. This paper now represents current thought, but because of fast changing times probably soon will be history.

APPENDIX I
SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION GUIDELINE



Core Curriculum, Course 2, USAWC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, "War, National Policy, and Strategy," p. 9.


MAP OF AUSTRO-HUNGARY



APPENDIX III

MAP OF HUNGARY AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES


Europe



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APPENDIX IV

THE NUMBER OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY LIVING OUTSIDE OF HUNGARY



APPENDIX V

MAJOR DATA OF HUNGARY AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	TOTAL AREA KM ²	BOUNDARIES WITH HUNGARY, KM	POPULATION	TOTAL ARMED FORCES	DEFENSE BUDGET \$	GOVERNMENT TYPE
HUNGARY	93,030	2,113	10,333,327	100,000	1.6bn 2.3% GDP	Republic
AUSTRIA	83,850	366	7,867,541	52,000	1.7bn 1% GDP	Federal Republic
SLOVENIA	20,296	82	1,963,000	15,000	170m 4.5% GDP	Emerging Democracy
CROATIA	56,538	292	4,784,000	105,000	NA	Parliamentary Democracy
FRY	102,350	151	10,642,000	135,000	3.76bn	Republic
ROMANIA	237,500	443	23,169,914	200,000	0.96bn	Republic
UKRAINE	603,700	103	51,940,426	230,000	r 116bn \$=r=1.7	Republic
SLOVAKIA	49,009	676	5,300,000	49,464	NA	Republic

ENDNOTES

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